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A Common Sense Approach to the Right to Food 
Naomi Hossain, Dolf te Lintelo and Alexandra Wanjiku Kelbert 
 
 
Summary 
Despite the growing activism and debate around the right to food in the past decade, there 
has been little exploration of what the right means in everyday life and in the routine 
encounters between states and citizens. This paper draws together original qualitative 
research in nine African, Asian and Latin American countries on how people talk about the 
right to food. It does so on the assumption that accountability for hunger depends on people 
being aware of that right. The paper explores what people at risk of hunger have to say 
about what the right to food means in their location; its source and origins; and 
responsibilities for upholding it. It concludes that while ideas of the right to food do not 
generally use international human rights language, an understanding of innate or natural 
rights to food is ‘common sense’: shared across contexts and groups, and part of how 
people negotiate their right to food in everyday life. Among other findings, the paper 
concludes that in a period of rapid economic and social development, the right to food of 
older people looks particularly fragile, and merits special attention.  
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Introduction  
We, the Heads of State and Government, or our representatives, gathered at the 
World Food Summit at the invitation of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, reaffirm the right of everyone to have access to safe and nutritious 
food, consistent with the right to adequate food and the fundamental right of everyone 
to be free from hunger. 
Opening statement of the Rome Declaration on World Food Security, World Food 
Summit, 1996. 
 
People need to know their rights in order to be able to demand change and 
accountability from the Government.  
Former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter 
(2012: 12) 
 
Q: Do hungry people have any rights to food here? 
In unison, the participants said that the hungry in their community have a right to food. 
MJ (28, motorbike rider) said, ‘we have the rights. However, we know little about them 
because we have not read and there is also ignorance.’ 
Q: Where do these rights come from? How do you know about them? 
The participants felt that the rights to food come from God and from the government. 
PK (44, community organiser) said, ‘the rights come from God. He gives us the 
knowledge of our rights. Our leaders are given the ability to give us the rights.’ 
NJ (24, unemployed) said, ‘the rights come from God. The government oppresses the 
poor.’ 
NM (38, community mobiliser) said, ‘the rights come from God but do not get to the 
intended people. The channel used by the government is bad.’ 
NJ: ‘the government knows that everyone has to eat yet it sets high prices for goods. It 
has also put the rights to food in the constitution.’ 
Q: What does a right to food mean to you? 
NM: ‘it means that Kenya has enough food for its entire people.’ 
SM (45, counsellor): ‘it means that it is everyone’s right to eat well.’ 
Transcript from focus-group discussion with men in Lango Baya, Coast Province, 
Kenya, 12 October 2013, as part of the Life in a Time of Food Price Volatility project 
 
Reference to ‘the right to food’ has become a fixture of food security debates since the 1996 
Rome Declaration on World Food Security. Legislation to enshrine the human right to food in 
law is increasingly prominent in efforts to address hunger and food insecurity. Yet to date 
there has been little attention to what such a right means to people at risk of hunger, or to 
how they articulate it. This paper responds to the idea that ‘people need to know their rights 
in order to claim them’, as former United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, 
Olivier De Schutter, states above. It is motivated by the perception that little is known about 
how the right to food acquires meaning in people’s everyday practices to secure food and 
nutrition. In helping to fill this gap, the paper highlights the dissonances and resonances 
between the right to food as an aspiration – an already always-existing legal right, albeit not 
necessarily realised through public policy – and ‘vernacular rights talk’, or the everyday 
norms and standards around which societies and families organise their efforts to meet their 
members’ most basic needs. These dissonances and resonances are heard in the 
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arguments from the focus group above: the Government of Kenya is responsible for realising 
their rights to food, but it lacks the capacity or political will to do so. Though God-given, the 
‘right to eat well’ is far from people’s experiences in drought-stricken coastal Kenya.  
The intellectual motivation of the paper is to explore popular conceptions of food rights as an 
entry point for the analysis of accountability for food security. Popular conceptions matter 
because they help make sense of the demands and claims citizens can reasonably be 
expected to make of their states. What people say about their rights provides insights into 
what people expect from or mandate their governments to do in relation to food security. 
Where enshrined in constitutional, statutory and subordinate laws or through established 
jurisprudence, the right to food expresses not just a desire to achieve people’s freedom from 
hunger; it explicates the responsibility of governments to ensure such outcomes and makes 
them accountable for doing so. 
 
A starting assumption is that effective accountability requires some level of common 
understanding between citizens (to whom accountability is owed) and the state (to be held 
accountable) about what the right to food entails substantively. It implies a shared set of 
justificatory principles that underpin this right. By comparing 'rights talk’ across different 
political and economic contexts, we can uncover not only the variations in expectations, but 
also in the principles that underpin them. The paper assesses how and how well a variety of 
popular conceptions or ‘common sense’ rights to food speak to legal and constitutional 
conceptions. 
 
A second assumption is that such conceptions are political ideas or ideologies, and not 
‘neutral’ information, knowledge or awareness. This is an important distinction because 
discussion of rights knowledge or awareness is often at risk of assuming that the ‘rights’ to 
which they refer are already real and objectively knowable. In the view that ‘rights’ mean the 
universal human rights of international law, popular conceptions are only of interest in terms 
of their proximity or distance from international human rights law. Yet debates about 
‘vernacular rights talk’ emphasise the crucial role of translation: how does international law 
become local norm and practice? How do language, culture and custom shape the 
contextualisation, communication and interpretation of global principles and standards? 
(Merry 2006; Goldstein 2013). To what extent does the vernacularisation of human rights 
principles empower the oppressed, the vulnerable and the hungry? (Hauser 2008). It is in 
light of these questions that we explore popular conceptions of the right to food.  
 
The historical literature on the political economy of food crises past offers insights into how 
popular conceptions of rights to food might ‘work’ within the political economy of food 
security. The moral economy literature tells us that popular conceptions of rights are formed 
and forged partly through experience of how and whether and when they are honoured, 
through how they are lived and enacted in everyday life and in the breach entailed by food 
crises. A ‘politics of provisions’ that enables hungry subjects to hold their rulers to account 
requires not only that people have such ideas, but also that they have the political means 
and motives for organising. Vernacular rights talk can offer access to these ideas, means 
and motives. Our interest here is in ‘the social processes of human rights implementation 
and resistance’; we do not debate the merits of universalism versus localism or whether 
human rights are a good idea; instead, we study ‘what difference they make’ (Merry 2006: 
39). Specifically, vernacular rights are interesting not only to the extent they resemble or 
differ from international human rights law, but also as a political, ideological act by people at 
risk of food insecurity, and a crucial part of the translation from international human rights 
legal precepts into the political economy of food security at national and local levels.  
It is important to study popular conceptions on their own terms because to focus only on 
their distance from or similarity to aspirational human rights risks underestimating their 
innate importance. This importance derives directly from the fact that how people conceive 
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of their rights to food – ideas they hold about what they should be able to eat, and how that 
ought to come about, or what Amartya Sen has termed ‘entitlements’ – are at the heart of 
the political economy of hunger (see Sen 1981a; Sen 1981b). What people think they are 
entitled to is the basis for what they claim – although what they claim is in turn shaped by 
what they have reason to expect. That the Kenyan Government has a mandate to realise 
food rights but fails to do so in the experience of the Kenyan men quoted above matters 
partly because it influences the strength of the idea of a right itself. It matters, therefore, to 
how and the extent to which Kenyans can and do act to claim it. 
 
In everyday life, of course, people infrequently have opportunities to demand their public 
authorities honour their rights to food. They may have ample motivation for doing so, but 
unless they have good reason to expect action, or their situation has suddenly changed, 
there may be no purpose to making claims. Yet the right to food does feature in everyday 
life, as this paper shows.1 By referring to the ‘common sense approach to the right to food’ 
we refer to two features of these everyday discourses. First, popular conceptions of food 
rights can be far from the aspirations of legal human rights framings. They reflect 
interpretations of their lived realities by people at risk of hunger. They are commonsensical 
in the idiomatic meaning: more realistic, or closer to reality, than the normative abstract 
theories and rhetorical moralities of global elites. 
Second, we talk of ‘common’ sense because it is significant that these ideas are shared, or 
common. Ideas about the right to food are neither random nor idiosyncratic. They are not, 
beyond a minimalist understanding of food rights as rooted in the natural ‘right to be’, 
universal; however, they are ideas that pertain to and are possessed by the group, whether 
the group is the moral community of the family, village, clan, tribe or nation. It is from their 
collective or social quality that the ideas gain meaning and power. The ‘common’ nature of 
these vernacular conceptions is striking because the emphasis on human rights as 
pertaining to individuals is at odds with an emphasis on rights as derived from membership 
of a collective.2 
That popular ideas about the right to food are shared may seem self-evident, but it is not a 
trivial observation. This is because counter-ideas – for instance, that there is no human right 
to food even when facing starvation – do exist, and have caught the attention of powerful 
elites in the recent past. Crude Malthusian ‘lifeboat’ or ‘triage’ theories of the 1960s and 
1970s proposed that rich countries should not waste their resources on the hopeless 
starving millions of the Third World, but focus resources, triage-style, on the peoples and 
places likely to survive (or become self-reliant).3  
This paper draws on the findings of qualitative research with people living on low and 
precarious incomes in 20 locations across nine countries in Latin America, sub-Saharan 
Africa, and South and South East Asia. The research focused on understanding how people 
conceptualise their right to food, where the idea comes from, and the responsibilities or 
actions it implies. Although undertaken with the open-ended aim of exploring popular ideas 
about the right to food, the research was motivated by thinking about how people view their 
rights (in a broad, not strictly legalistic, sense) to food, and how their relationships with the 
state and each other shape those rights.  
                                                             
1  Moral economy arguments came to the fore at times when the agreements over food rights were breached. The 
research reported here took place soon after a period of rapid food price rises, but not during a food crisis (other than 
the routine crises of poverty). So the popular conceptions of food rights discussed here are ‘everyday’ conceptions, not 
those articulated in the heat of crisis (Thompson 1971).   
2  Sen’s entitlement approach to famine analysis has similarly been critiqued for its methodological individualism, and 
effective failure to explain why some groups lack or lose entitlements – a socio-political more than an economic matter 
(see Devereux 2001). 
3  These ideas were popularised in the sensationalist Famine 1975! (Paddock and Paddock 1968) and Hardin (1974). It is 
hard now to imagine that such arguments influenced policy, but triage ‘theory’ held considerable sway on the policy 
elite imagination during this period (see Howe and Sewell 1975; Rothschild 1976). 
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The paper is organised into four sections. Section 1 sets out the rationale for the paper, 
situating it in the relevant debates. Section 2 sets out the conceptual framework, approach 
and research methodology. Section 3 sets out the main empirical findings, organised 
around: a) What the right to food means in popular discourse; b) the sources or origins and 
content of popular perceptions of the right to food; and c) the allocation of responsibilities for 
realising the right to food. Section 4 reflects on the findings of the paper and concludes with 
discussion of the implications of the research for advocacy, policy and further research.  
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1 Rationale: why popular conceptions of the 
right to food matter 
 
1.1 The right to food and accountability for hunger  
Global food price crises, the persistence of high levels of hunger (870 million people in 
2011–2013 (FAO 2013) and under-nutrition (Black et al. 2013) are the backdrop against 
which the right to food has risen to prominence in international and national policy 
discourses on hunger in the 21st century. In many ways, this emergence involved the gradual 
breathing of life into slumbering international and national laws on social and economic 
human rights, which have been secondary to the political and civil rights privileged by 
neoliberal development theory and praxis (Englund 2006; Howard 1983). The right to 
adequate food is recognised under Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948)); under Article 11 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted on 16 December 1966, G.A. 
Res. 2200A (XXII), U.N. GAOR, 21st sess., Supp. No. 16, U.S. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 
UNTS 3), as interpreted by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (General 
Comment No. 12: The right to adequate food (1999), UN doc. E/C.12/1999/5) (De Schutter 
2012). Additionally, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) recognise the right 
to food (Knuth and Vidar 2011). 
 
The constitutions of many countries already explicitly or implicitly reference the right to food. 
Knuth and Vidar (2011) identify 23 countries that explicitly reference the right to food in their 
constitutions. Some constitutions explicitly reference the right, but it is justiciable only if 
enshrined in bills of rights or fundamental rights sections (e.g. Brazil, Kenya, South Africa), 
but not where set out in sections on directive principles of state policy (Bangladesh, India4, 
Malawi). Only in the former can citizens hold governments to account through the courts if 
they fail to deliver on the right. The right to food can be explicitly located within constitutional 
articles that reference another human right. For instance, in Brazil, Article 7 asserts a right to 
a minimum wage capable of satisfying, among others, people’s food needs. Jurisprudence 
also plays a role. Famously, the Supreme Court of India ruled that Article 21 of the 
constitution, which sets out a right to life with dignity, embeds in it the right to food (Petition 
(Civil) No. 196/2001, People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India & Others (PUCL)). 
This judgement transformed the right to food, hitherto expressed as a directive principle of 
state policy, into a fundamental right.  
 
Many constitutions guarantee broader human rights (for instance to development) within 
which ‘according to their normal meaning in international law’, the right to food is implicit 
(Knuth and Vidar 2011: 16). This is the case in Ethiopia. Finally, countries that have ratified 
international human rights laws and conventions that recognise the right to food such as the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (162 states parties)5 and 
CEDAW (188 states parties6) are legally bound to their provisions. In a few countries, such 
international law is automatically given legal status superior or equivalent to constitutional 
law (e.g. Argentina, Venezuela), whereas in most others its status is inferior to constitutional 
law, yet superior or equivalent to national statutory law (Knuth and Vidar 2011).  
 
                                                             
4  Article 47 of the Indian Constitution is an aspirational ‘Directive Principle’ that creates a non-enforceable ‘duty of the 
state to raise the level of nutrition and the standard of living and to improve public health.’  
5  https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?chapter=4&lang=en&mtdsg_no=iv-3&src=treaty, (accessed 6 May 2015) 
6  www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/states.htm, (accessed 6 May 2015) 
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Despite such anchoring in international law, it is only since the 1996 World Food Summit in 
Rome that the right to food has started to have policy traction. In 2004, the General Council 
of the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (UN) recommended 
‘Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food 
in the Context of National Food Security’. Top-level appointments in the FAO are indicative 
of the momentum: current Director General Dr Graziano Da Silva was the architect of the 
Zero Hunger policy which delivered the constitutional right to food in Brazil. Since 2000, a 
UN Special Rapporteur has been mandated with promoting the full realisation of the right to 
food through measures at national, regional and international levels. The Special Rapporteur 
reports to the UN General Assembly and exercises important global intellectual leadership. 
Olivier De Schutter, the recent-past Special Rapporteur posits the right to food as more than 
a legal instrument expressing an ambition to achieve citizens’ freedom from hunger. Rather, 
it is to be understood as a ‘compass to ensure that policies are geared towards alleviating 
hunger and malnutrition’7.  
 
De Schutter explicitly argues for a view of the right to food as an accountability tool (De 
Schutter 2012). Where enshrined in constitutional, statutory and subordinate laws or through 
established jurisprudence, the right to food expresses not just a desire to achieve people’s 
freedom from hunger; it also explicitly sets out the responsibilities of governments to ensure 
such outcomes. Under what conditions can governments be held accountable for ensuring 
the right to food? Effective accountability at a minimum8 requires some level of common 
understanding between people or citizens as account holders and the state (to be held 
accountable) about what this right to food entails substantively, as well as a shared set of 
justificatory principles underpinning this right. This paper hence explores popular 
conceptions, or a ‘common sense’ to the right to food and assesses how well these speak to 
legal/constitutional notions.  
 
1.2 Rights to subsistence and the moral economy 
Contemporary ‘politics of provisions’ (Bohstedt 2014) are part of wider social movements 
that bring together transnational networks with localised struggles. Three distinct yet linked 
movements are the food sovereignty movement, spearheaded by the international peasant 
network La Via Campesina; the Right to Food movement, with close connections to the 
United Nations system and the apparatus of international human rights law; and the food 
justice movement, which draws together localised food rights movements under broad 
banners of environmental and economic justice, and has a strong US presence – although 
‘food justice’ has been taken up by international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
like Oxfam since the food price crisis of 2008. 
 
These movements share a ‘moral economy’ form, although their political and organisational 
differences can be substantial. That is, ideas about food rights work as activating principles 
for political action against the predations of market forces on food systems seen as just, 
desirable or essential for survival. The concept of the moral economy here is closer to that of 
Thompson (1991) than of Scott (1977) in that it is not only about the logics of peasant 
production, but specifically about the inherent paradoxes of markets in food (Edelman 2005; 
Hossain and Kalita 2014). Ideas of rights and responsibilities in relation to agricultural 
production and markets appear reasonably widespread:  
 
  
                                                             
7  www.srfood.org/en/national-implementation, (accessed 6 May 2015) 
8  Minimum, because there are other dimensions of accountability that need to be in place for it to work: mandate, 
monitoring, enforcement. 
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Peasant conceptions of “justice,” as described by Scott for Southeast Asia in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries, are not, in their general outlines, very much different for 
other times and places (say, late-20th-century Latin America) … Also significant are 
the expectations, developed over long historical time, of what states and elites may 
claim and of what they must, in turn, provide in times of necessity. Finally, the issues 
of what values are commensurable, of what can be turned into a commodity, and of 
what natural or commonly held resources can be appropriated for private use and 
profit also loom large in the rural poor’s understanding of justice. 
(Edelman 2005: 332) 
 
It is not surprising, then, that the food sovereignty, right to food and food justice movements 
share a strong idea of justice in relation to food. What varies is whether it is ‘fair prices’ for 
consumers, producers or both; the specifics of sufficiency with respect to quality and 
quantity; the extent to which environmental sustainability is considered in production; and 
how equality in distribution or access is understood. For instance, gender equality is 
specifically assured under the individualism of human rights law, but communitarian peasant 
movements do not necessarily make such commitments to women. A conception of justice 
implies action by those tasked with protecting rights. Each movement conceives those 
responsibilities differently, for instance, official action at global or national level to prevent 
land grabs, regulate commercial agricultural production or actively protect smallholder 
farmers against larger actors, regulate food marketing systems and deliver food assistance 
or social protection when subsistence crises strike. All three movements also reject the total 
commoditisation of foodstuffs, with all setting limits on the rightful profit from food marketing. 
They say that not only do food markets never work to achieve the just aims of a desirable 
food system in practice, but that they cannot in theory, either. The idea of a perfectly 
functioning market in food is always and inherently misconceived.9 
 
The food sovereignty movement has developed rich conceptualisations of the right to food 
that include systematic transformation and structural change, arguing that people are poor 
and hungry not because they are excluded from markets but because of the adverse terms 
of their inclusion (Mcmichael and Schneider 2011). The principles of food sovereignty 
demand the right of nations to maintain agricultural capacities with due respect for cultural 
and dietary diversity, and principles of entitlement and redistribution, where resource-poor 
farmers (in particular historically disadvantaged groups) move beyond being ‘beneficiaries’ 
towards having control of the food system (Pimbert 2006). Food sovereignty explicitly 
addresses the power politics of the food system, rejecting the corporate food regime and 
agri-food monopoly power (McMichael 2009), focusing on land redistribution, family farming, 
regional food systems, community rights to water and seed; and opposing development-
induced land displacement, land-grabbing and northern agricultural subsidies (La Via 
Campesina 2011). Moral economic principles regarding the just and equitable distribution of 
resources, locally and at a global geopolitical level, are foundational and it is argued that the 
right to food under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights encompasses not merely 
access to food, but an empowerment agenda for marginalised food producers (Mechlem 
2004).  
 
1.3 Vernacular rights talk 
One question worth asking is, to what extent are the concepts that give motive and meaning 
to transnational movements like food sovereignty or right to food shared by the general 
population? How do people who are not (yet) actively engaged in politicised struggles 
around food understand the right to food? (see, for instance, Boyer 2010).  
                                                             
9  For an overview of food movements, see Patel (2012). On food sovereignty, see Beuchelt and Virchow (2012); 
Edelman (2005); Edelman (2003); Patel (2009); Sampson and Wills (2013); on the Right to food, see De Schutter 
(2014); Knuth and Vidar (2011); Mechlem (2004); and on food justice, see Alkon and Norgaard (2009); Bailey (2011); 
Gottlieb and Joshi (2013). 
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We know that many recent ‘food riots’ and other local struggles around food were not part of 
these global movements, even though they often expressed closely similar concerns (see 
Hossain et al. 2014; Hossain and Kalita 2014). This suggests that the family of concepts 
around justice, rights and sovereignty with respect to food resonates across contexts. We 
also know that the political work of mobilising groups has involved the creation of new rights 
(such as the rights of peasants and the rights of people to food sovereignty) within the family 
of the right to food (Claeys 2012). That people who have not been politicised into these 
struggles talk in similar language and that the rights themselves are transformed by popular 
mobilisation indicates that what Merry calls the ‘vernacularisation’ – the translation or 
indigenisation – of the human right to food may be especially productive and enriching of 
both meanings and their place in political practice. 
 
In making sense of how people talk about the right to food, it has been useful to recognise 
that the universal normative appeal of human rights need not impose fixed content on either 
theoretical or empirical grounds. Tsing’s (2005) concept of ‘engaged universals’ argues that 
while universal human rights may appear absolute and monolithic on paper (in conventions 
and international discourses), they in practice perform an aspirational function, to which 
political action brings historically specific and situated content. Such ‘engaged universals’ 
are sufficiently porous to absorb changed meanings over time; they are always used 
contextually (Tsing 2005; Englund 2006; Butler 2000, in Englund 2006), as well as 
relationally (Brown 1995, in Madhok 2009). 
Merry’s well-known term ‘vernacularization’ (2006) captures the process of translation into 
hybridised concepts that inspire or explain political action, through which 
 
ideas from transnational sources travel to small communities [becoming] 
vernacularized, or adapted to local institutions and meanings… Human rights 
language is similarly extracted from the universal and adapted to national and local 
communities.  
(Merry 2006: 39) 
 
This is not just translation in a linguistic sense, but also ‘indigenisation’, in which ideas from 
the global gain symbolic associations and meanings in the local setting, or come to be 
framed as political concerns with local resonance. For Merry, a key actor in the process of 
vernacularisation is the intermediary or translator, the organiser or human rights activist (or 
organisation). This actor typically ‘faces both ways’, bilingual in the language of human rights 
and in local conceptualisations of rights, as well as alert to the possibilities of their local 
political framings. These actors translate both up and down; a particularly successful 
‘upward’ translation of vernacular rights discourses may even create new human rights (see 
Claeys 2012). But the extent to which vernacularisation comes about ranges from perfect 
replication (a transfer or cloning of ideas from the global to the local), to hybrid forms of 
rights in which ‘imported institutions and symbols [merge] with local ones’ (Merry 2006: 44). 
Other possibilities are that they may be rejected as foreign imports, or subverted to 
alternative ends. In a good example, top-down translations of human rights into local 
languages in Malawi left no space for Malawians to make the concepts their own (Englund 
2011).  
 
Mobilisation around rights uses political, linguistic and normative strategies to stretch and 
dislodge the existing normative boundaries of the universal (Butler 1997, in Madhok 2009), 
changing the meaning and conceptual construct of rights itself. Paradoxically, such politics 
seek to particularise these rights using ideas of normative universalism. Thus, Nyamu-
Musembi (2002: 1) argues that ‘rights are shaped through actual struggles informed by 
people’s own understandings of what they are justly entitled to’ (emphasis added). Tagliarina 
(2013: 5) states that ‘human rights often can be unintelligible to groups, and thus must be 
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remade in the group’s vernacular before the group can fully employ human rights talk.’ 
Consequently, looking at the meaning of rights from the perspective of those claiming them 
can ‘transcend accepted normative parameters of human rights debates, question 
established conceptual categories and expand the range of claims that are validated as 
rights’ (Nyamu-Musembi 2005: 31). 
 
While vernacularisation is commonly seen as the process of indigenisation of transnational 
concepts within particular communities (Goldstein 2013: 111), Madhok notes that human 
rights translations not only draw on local vocabularies, but are also accommodated within 
existing ‘norms governing entitlements, roles and identities’ (Madhok 2009: 4). That is, the 
back-translation may be important for how the universal concept frames the political 
aspirations it gives rise to. For instance, in the South Asian context, human rights derived 
from Western Enlightenment thinking are translated with reference to ancient pre-existing 
notions of rights such as haq (Madhok 2009).10 The universal right to food, promoted by 
international organisations and occasionally inserted wholesale in national law through 
ratification of international conventions and human rights law (Knuth and Vidar 2011), is not 
inscribed on tabulae rasae.  
 
As well as having ‘pre-codified’ precursors, the way human rights are practised is contextual 
and relational. Relationally, human rights are intrinsic to all persons irrespective of cultural 
and political affiliation, yet their realisation and protection depend on individuals’ relations to 
the state and other groups. Thus human rights ‘gain meaning within situational arguments 
about membership in political society, not through arguments that depend on the concept of 
abstract humanity’ (Englund 2006: 28). In South Asia, despite ‘the long intellectual and 
literary history of Haq within the vernacular, it is fair to say that individual rights do not 
regulate interpersonal relations in social life either in North India or Pakistan’ (Madhok, 2009: 
17). Indian and Pakistani grassroots’ movements have mobilised rights discourses to claim 
social, political and economic entitlements and liberties from the state, but predominantly 
framed around religious, caste and regional markers of identity, and reference universal and 
individualist human rights to pursue group rights. Arguably, therefore, the translation of the 
right to food is mediated by existing moral economies of the right to subsistence, which rest 
on custom and tradition. Hossain and Kalita (2014: 3) ask ‘(i)f claims to food within the moral 
economy rest on custom or tradition, how might a legally enforceable human right to food 
change that?’  
 
Our review of the Anglophone literature on the right to food suggests there has to date been 
relatively little attention to ‘pre-translation’ vernacular conceptions of the right to food, 
reflecting the relatively recent emphasis on the right to food in global activism, policy and 
scholarly discourse (see also Goodale 2009). The rich literature on the food sovereignty 
movement grants important insights into the content and meaning of the right to food in 
indigenous and peasant societies involved in activist networks, and also into the process of 
translation or vernacularisation (see, for instance, Shawki 2015). Other cases, such as the 
struggles over an agricultural modernisation project affecting the Merauke people in 
Indonesian Papua, highlight the process of vernacularisation of the right to food through 
workshops and meetings between civil society groups and indigenous community members 
(see Hadiprayitno 2015). But how – if at all – are these rights conceived before the 
translators and intermediaries get to work? What can we learn about the conceptualisation of 
the right to food if, instead of ‘taking recognized human rights as a departure point, [we look] 
at human rights in their pre-codified form’ (Claeys 2012: 845)? What does vernacular talk of 
the right to food tell us about popular political aspirations to secure accountability for 
hunger? 
                                                             
10  Madhok identifies five different justificatory premises underpinning the employment of the word haq: rights as marking 
citizenship, rights as justifying political participation, cosmological/ancestral justifications, moral/normative and religious 
(Islamic) justifications (Madhok 2009). She finds that the most ubiquitous use of the term haq is in relation to claiming 
what are seen as legitimate entitlements from the state (2010: 642). 
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2 Approach, conceptual framework and 
methodology 
 
2.1 Assumptions, propositions and research questions  
Despite much discussion of the right to food, there is little analysis of what this means in 
popular public discourse. Although we recognise that human rights talk is likely to influence 
everyday political discourse, we focus on the views of groups who are not actively or 
professionally involved in political mobilisation around the right to food or food sovereignty. 
We do not assume that their rights talk will be pristinely devoid of influences from 
international human rights discourse, and we aim also to understand how those ideas filter 
through to those who are not actively engaged in political mobilisation. But we do expect that 
these groups will be less directly influenced by human rights language and concepts, and 
more by the customary and the vernacular. We aim in this way to gain a sense of the 
settings in which Merry’s intermediaries and translators get to work.  
 
Another assumption here is that accountability depends on people being equipped to claim 
their rights, and that among the factors that contribute to accountability is a recognition that 
rights exist, even if that existence has, to date, been nominal only. That is, for people to be 
able to claim their right to food, they need to know they have them (De Schutter 2014).  
 
The research on which this paper is based was designed to explore relations of 
accountability through an examination of local systems for addressing hunger or food 
insecurity, drawing on the conceptual framework developed for the 2004 World Development 
Report Making Services Work for Poor People. This summarises the main relationships of 
accountability between three groups:  
 
1. Citizens and politicians/policymakers: citizens mandate governments to protect food 
rights, set standards and monitor or create information, often via political parties, civil 
society action, donor influence, and even research like this;    
2. Politicians/policymakers and frontline providers: policymakers set standards for 
performance, provide budgets and authority, set up information systems, monitor 
performance, and sanction failures;    
3. Citizens and frontline providers: citizens make claims on providers, provide feedback 
about performance, and take direct action when services fail.    
 
The field research focused on exploring the third relationship (see King et al. 2014), but 
recognised that the outcomes on the ground (an acknowledged, officially accepted right to 
food, resources to match, and monitoring and management systems for frontline service 
delivery), are all in turn influenced by the strength of the mandate governments to address 
hunger, their capacity and willingness to resource and enforce that mandate on the ground, 
and therefore on the relationships between citizens and politicians as well as between 
politicians, policymakers and frontline officials (see Goetz and Jenkins 2005; Levy and 
Walton 2013). This implies that popular ideas of a right to food should influence whether and 
how people are empowered to claim rights from frontline officials like agricultural extension 
workers, relief and social protection scheme managers, and political representatives like 
chiefs or local councillors. But at the same time, the content of those ideas, and the extent to 
which they are shared and agreed, should offer insights into the politics of hunger in that 
setting. This will include whether there is a live political debate about hunger, and 
competition between parties or public authorities to be seen to tackle it; what people expect 
of the authorities with respect to action on food security; and about the likely costs and 
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consequences of failures to tackle hunger, in terms of loss of authority or legitimacy, or more 
concretely, of elections or public office.  
 
Figure 1 Conceptualising relationships of accountability for hunger 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: King et al. (2014) 
 
 
We expect that people’s concepts of the content and implications of the right to food will be 
influenced by two broad factors. First, the nature of their own relationship to food, for 
instance, whether their food insecurity concerns are primarily matters of production or of 
consumption, is likely to influence how they conceive the content of the right. For smallholder 
farmers, the right to food may mean the right to control over the means of production (as in 
ideas about food sovereignty): to own or cultivate land, for stable access to agricultural 
inputs, regulation to prevent environmental degradation. For people whose relationship to 
food is as consumers, the right is likely to imply consumption protections. For people who 
face chronic hunger, that may mean sustainable livelihoods and/or long-term social 
protection (e.g. pensions or credit). In situations where food crises are frequent (seasonal or 
increasing because of geopolitical or climate events) it may mean emergency assistance to 
food or entitlements to food (cash, vouchers, work). People may prioritise their rights to safe 
or culturally appropriate food where these are under threat. Women and men may hold 
systematically different views depending on how they are situated with respect to food 
production, food marketing, and responsibilities for nourishing families. 
 
The second broad influencing factor is the normative and actual role of their state in 
promoting or protecting food security. Here we suggest three possible distinctions. First, 
people are more likely to believe they have a realisable right to food where the state is 
visible in food policy (active in food marketing and regulation, agricultural extension work and 
input supply, hunger- and nutrition-related social protection) than if their state leaves food 
production and distribution largely to the invisible forces of the market. Second, where a 
major food crisis is collectively remembered and has created an ‘anti-famine social contract’, 
or a political culture in which people expect food crises to trigger public action (de Waal 
1996), people are likely to hold reasonably robust ideas about the right to food as implying 
state action. Third, recent public debates about economic and social rights, perhaps through 
constitutional reforms, political mobilisation or civil society awareness-raising, would 
contribute to clear, strong ideas about the right to food means and its implications.  
 
Short route to 
accountability 
Long route to 
accountability 
Policymakers 
e.g. Executive, Ministries of Food, 
Agriculture, Social Protection 
Frontline providers 
e.g. Local government, village heads, 
agricultural extension workers 
Citizens & service-users 
e.g. food insecure or undernourished 
people 
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With these propositions about the major influences on the right to food in mind, this paper 
asks the following: 
 
 What, if anything, does the right to food mean to people at risk of hunger?  
 Where does a right to food originate?  
 What actions does it imply? By whom? 
  
2.2 Approach, research design and limitations 
The field research was conducted as part of ongoing qualitative research in 23 rural, urban 
and peri-urban sites across ten countries, selected to enable an exploration of the well-being 
impacts of food price changes on everyday life among people living with or vulnerable to 
poverty and hunger. The research is part of a larger study exploring the social impacts of 
food price changes, following the commodity price spikes and rises starting in 2007. The 
project is sociological in that it aims to gain a global picture of the impacts of food price 
changes on patterns of everyday life, including reported effects on paid and unpaid work, 
consumption and nourishment, and family and community relations. The research takes 
global food price changes as its starting point, and drills down to individual experiences and 
effects.  
 
The sites comprise a mix of people who may be comfortable or living with poverty at any 
given time, but who all live with a degree of precariousness because their work or reliance 
on food markets exposes them to global market volatilities (in which respect they resemble 
people on low and precarious incomes worldwide). In selecting a small number of sites from 
a relatively large sample of countries we aim for an illustrative sense of how national food 
policies and systems shape everyday lives. While the findings are not ‘representative’ of the 
countries in which the research was conducted, national context influences the findings, and 
it is in relation to national social, policy and political contexts that we make sense of them. In 
particular with respect to the exploration of ideas and meanings of rights, any effort to 
achieve representativeness would have to be at the cost of depth. So to the extent that place 
matters in how we have researched people’s views on the right to food, it is because it helps 
to situate and make sense of people’s views, and not because we take them as 
representative of their compatriots’ attitudes and experiences.  
 
A limitation of the work is that the results are sensitive to the approach taken in each socio-
political setting and language. The study did not take an ethnographically open-ended or 
minutely context-sensitive approach, which might have yielded a more nuanced picture of 
varied local meanings. It specifically looked instead for the ‘common sense’ – shared 
understandings about what food rights mean. From the patterned differences and similarities 
across the contexts, an analysis was developed about why food rights are framed in the way 
they are in different contexts. This means that the findings are influenced by the line of 
questioning, which was similar in all the countries.  
 
This partly reflects the scale of the comparative exercise (and is itself suggestive of the 
challenges faced by human rights activists in their work of ‘vernacularisation’). As 15 
languages are spoken across these sites, there must be a common set of concepts and 
tools with which to speak about the same matter in each country. Researchers interpret and 
adapt these concepts from ‘international English’ to terms that have relevance in each local 
context. This makes sense given that the discourse and practice of human rights, and of a 
right to food specifically, come from the international context. But it was clear from how the 
researchers approached the questions and from how answers are framed, that in the effort 
to make comparative sense, ideas and nuances are lost in translation, in both directions. 
 
The sense that the research findings are partly conditional on what was asked and how, is 
not only methodological self-critique. It also reflects that a right to food is an abstract and 
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imprecise notion until given specific, local content through political struggle. The idea of a 
‘right’ applies uncertainly to food, the act of eating, the organisation of food systems, and the 
experiences of hunger and food security. (It is not the only social and economic right for 
which this is true, of course.) With the caveats that our research approach forced the 
language of ‘right to food’ onto people who may conceptualise these issues differently, and 
that these are in themselves conceptually complex and empirically variable, we think that the 
findings from the comparative analysis of the meaning of the right to food are sufficiently rich 
and instructive to be worth exploring in depth.  
 
2.3 Tools and analysis 
Research participants were mainly drawn from low- and very low-income households, and in 
all sites they included some of the poorest as well as people who are vulnerable because 
they are elderly, disabled, orphaned, or woman-headed households. Tools included 
community background and context data collection; ten or more longitudinal qualitative 
household case studies in each location; focus-group discussions with occupation or social 
groups (e.g. agricultural wage workers, food traders, youth); and key informant interviews 
with local administrative officials, NGO staff, religious or community leaders, local business 
people, and politicians; and local price data collection. 
  
The community case studies were developed to fit local contexts, capacities, and traditions 
of the researchers undertaking the research. While a set of guidelines was shared among all 
the teams, the researchers adapted them as they saw fit. All, however, addressed the same 
research questions, and much of the data generated can be analysed comparatively. 
Interviews with more than 400 household members and key informants were undertaken and 
100 focus-group discussions mean that around 1,500 people participated in the research. 
The qualitative data were written up and translated in each country, and then coded and 
analysed using qualitative analysis software. 
 
3 Popular conceptions of the right to food: 
research findings from 23 sites 
3.1 What does the right to food mean here? 
A sense of what (if anything) the right to food meant to people was explored by starting with 
questions about the empirical realities of food rights. The suggested sequence of questions 
was: 
 
‘Do hungry people have any right to food here? 
Where do these rights come from? 
How do you know about them? 
What does a right to food mean to you? 
Who is responsible for protecting those rights?’ 
 
The degree of success with which these questions generated discussion varied according to 
the understandings of the researchers themselves, the resonance of the ideas in the socio-
political context, conceptual universe and language, and on whether the research 
participants themselves had factual knowledge of the issues and/or a conceptual grasp or 
experience of economic and social rights. In some places, most notably the otherwise starkly 
contrasting polities of Indonesia (Java and Kalimantan) and Viet Nam, the idea of a right to 
food was unfamiliar; in the six sites in these countries, it ranged from difficult to impossible to 
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have the more abstract and conceptual discussions about the content or meaning of the right 
at all.11  
 
Our propositions about the conditions that influence understandings of the right to food held 
up in several contexts; in others they needed refining or a rethink. For instance, the recent 
experience of a food crisis had had a significant impact on participants in Burkina Faso, 
where the 2008 food crisis had resulted in popular protests and public action in the form of 
efforts to stabilise prices and ensure affordable access to food (Engels 2014; Sneyd, 
Legwegoh and Fraser 2013). Across the rural and small-town respondents, whether 
personally at risk of hunger or key informants from professional groups, people were clear 
that the right to food was an innate or natural right, because it presupposed the right to live 
(and in some views, to work). Mr PK, 75, a retired nurse from the town of Kaya, explained: ‘if 
I am not entitled to eat it means that I do not have the right to exist’. Young married women 
from rural Nessemtenga agreed that the right to food was innate: ‘we know quite simply that 
all human beings must eat to live – if not [they] will die’.  
 
That the existence of public action to establish the right to food helped foster strong ideas of 
the right to food was partly supported by the views of Bolivians in the town of Kami. There, 
people rejected the idea of a right to food because they did not see it as a reality. Mrs E, a 
78-year-old retired teacher, and her husband, did not only criticise the state for this failure, 
but also saw the increasing individualisation of society as the reason the right could not 
exist: ‘No, no one cares about people who do not have enough resources to eat … [there] no 
longer exists cooperation between people as there was before.’ Her views were echoed by 
her neighbour Mrs C, at 65 retired from the mining industry, who said: 
 
No, no right is recognised, especially for older people who are left to their fate, 
no one cares if they eat or do not. My neighbour is a grandmother alone, and 
nobody cares about her, she has no pension or any income, she is going through 
difficult times, sometimes she doesn’t eat. 
 
These views indicate a cynical view of the right to food, which neither public action nor 
community solidarity seemed capable of enforcing. 
 
3.2 The substance and limits of the right 
At the lower end of the income spectrum, where people have more personal experience of 
hunger, the right to food was an innate or a natural right because it presupposed the right to 
life or to survival. The right to food meant the right not to starve or to go hungry in Burkina 
Faso; in Bangladesh it meant the right to eat three times a day.  
Some of the people with the most to gain from a realisable right to food, including vulnerable 
farmers and marginalised people in the poorest countries, were also those with the weakest 
sense of the right to food. In Ethiopia, the dominant discourse appeared to be that the right 
to food meant the right to feed oneself and one’s family through the right to work, as we will 
see below, apparently reflecting a higher order political discourse about dependency. In 
other words, the right to food had transmuted into the responsibility to feed oneself. Not all 
views there lent themselves to blaming the hungry, but they were notably common. Mr AA, a 
41-year-old farmer from the western Oromia region, appeared to hold older, less politically 
                                                             
11  For Viet Nam, the research teams concluded that an exploration of the meanings of a right to food was redundant in a 
context in which the right was embedded within wider economic and social rights; they decided it was more valuable to 
explore the meaning of nutrition and knowledge of food security programmes and policies at the local level. Although it 
is regrettable that we lost the opportunity to explore how economic and social rights are framed within a Communist 
polity, the difficulties of undertaking comparative research on these issues forces us to recognise the greater 
challenges involved in attempting global conceptualisations and mobilisation. Vietnamese research participants did, 
however, address topics about the mechanics of local accountability for hunger, and so some of the research findings 
from those three sites are included here. 
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influenced views of the right to food: ‘people have the right to food… Everyone has to eat 
food. No one should be starved.’ The factual truth that everyone ‘has to eat food’ in order to 
be people at all seems to make it self-evidently true that people normatively have such a 
right – it is inherent to humanity. In relation to Ethiopia, in particular, it is worth raising the 
possibility that an emphasis on the right to food as originating in the right to work / feed 
oneself may reflect the latter-day reflections of popular responses to collectivisation policies 
under the Derg. For food farmers, ideas about the right to food are more than likely to reflect 
this history, and so it is possible that rather than a narrative of blaming the hungry, the 
emphasis on the right to work reflects a pushing back against or rejection of authoritarian 
collectivist agrarian policies in which public investment neglected smallholders in favour of 
unproductive collective farms (Belete, Dillon and Anderson 1991; Omiti et al. 2000). 
In Guatemala, another of the lower-income countries, many participants could not conceive 
of ‘a right to food’ but nevertheless had some sense that their hunger could not go 
unaddressed – someone must be responsible for helping them. In this way, although the 
language of rights was unfamiliar in relation to food, there were, nonetheless, duty-bearers. 
Some of the poorest people in the highlands town of Santo Tomás Chichicastenango and in 
Chugüexá Primero in the mountainous rural west faced extreme hunger and chronic 
malnutrition. Older people like Mr and Mrs PC, 73 and 60 respectively, living in penury on 
what they could earn from a little portering and handicrafts, had no idea about ‘the right to 
food’, but they certainly knew what hunger was: 
Sometimes we only boil some water and if we are thirsty or hungry we drink only 
water. We are starving most of the time because we do not have money. The 
food is there at the market but we cannot buy it because we do not have the 
money to pay for it, so we starve. We starve ourselves; we eat only two or three 
tamalitos per day. 
When asked who was responsible for helping people tackle hunger they answered that it 
was ‘the president’, but they ‘do not know how to ask for help’. That did not mean they were 
sitting idle: both continued to try to work, and to seek assistance. A month earlier, Mr PC had 
found out how to ask for help from local officials who promised to send a social worker, but 
they were still waiting. 
For Mrs H, a 70-year-old widow living in Naogaon in north-western Bangladesh, with her 
divorced 35-year-old daughter and her two children, the right to food arose from her 
vulnerability, but her right depended also on her virtue:  
 
If I can’t work, I must ask for help from ten[?] members of the society. I’m old and 
feeble, they must help me. I beg but I don’t steal. I will ask from people and they 
will give something to eat. This is my right. 
 
The idea that the right to food incurs responsibilities to make the best effort possible to feed 
oneself was reasonably widespread: there was no assumption that such a right meant 
people could lead a life of ease. The possibility that a right might encourage laziness was 
particularly concerning for some Ethiopian participants, with their strong discourse against 
dependency on food assistance. A similar theme of self-blame was heard in the mountains 
in Chugüexá Primero, a community of K’iche’ speaking indigenous people, where people 
blamed hunger partly on alcoholism among household heads.  
 
The idea of moral hazard in relation to the right to food was turned on its head by Mr TS, 42, 
a Mayan judge and farmer in Chichicastenango: 
 
Those who are hungry cannot work, cannot walk, and cannot think… they are 
like fainting, sick. If you are not hungry, you are happy, quiet… If we eat well we 
are quiet, we feel happy all the time, perform with all of our energy, otherwise we 
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are sleepy, lazy… It all gets complicated with illnesses, and then it gets more 
serious. It is specified by law, yes, we all have the right to food; but the problem 
is that we do not have the money to buy with. The law says that we have the 
right, but to buy with what? If there are no jobs? The high cost of life and the fact 
that there are no jobs, and then we do not eat well…    
 
The circularity of chronic hunger breeding lethargy preventing people from working to feed 
themselves directly challenges the logic that ‘lazy people have no right to food’. For those of 
us who have never experienced the effects of chronic hunger first-hand it is a struggle to 
imagine the lassitude and loss of energy it engenders (for a famous account, see Sorokin 
1975). The innate and self-evident nature of the right to food in many views relates to this 
connection to the ability to flourish. As an agricultural cooperative member in rural 
Chikwanda, in Zambia’s northern province, explained it: ‘right to food means a right to 
health, a right to education and a right to life. Without food, you can’t get an education, you 
can’t have good health, you can’t have life’.  
 
For Mr R, a local political leader in Naogaon in north-western Bangladesh, the right to food 
did not mean the right to luxury items like meat or fish, but at least the right to eat ‘enough to 
maintain health’. Mrs F, a 60-year-old washerwoman in the town of Kami in Bolivia, similarly 
thought that the right meant ‘that people can eat what they need to be in good health’.  
 
The content and meaning of the right to food is not static, because the stressors on 
societies’ food needs change over time. In Dhaka city in Bangladesh, Mr H, the 50-year-old 
owner of a small restaurant, said: 
 
Nobody here is hungry. Everybody has a job – domestic help, garment factory, 
rickshaw, day labour etc. Now people are fine everywhere, city or village, they 
have jobs. I don’t see hungry people nowadays. Nobody is hungry, whatever you 
think, just write what I say…  
 
For Mr H, the present situation of relative plenty is a great contrast to the past, but the 
fact of relative plenty does not negate the right to food: 
 
There were so many people who used to live with empty stomachs for day after 
day about 70 or 80 years ago in our country… While I was [just] old enough to 
understand, 40 or 45 years ago, I saw so many people living hungry. They ate 
flour mush, rice with water lily to stave of hunger. I saw many after liberation...12 
Those who had up to 20 or 30 or 40 bigha13 of land lived with empty stomachs. 
Crops damaged due to flood, rainfall. They didn’t cultivate any crop. Led life 
doing nothing. When they couldn’t pay back the loans… they handed over their 
lands. Many left their lands fearing to pay tax. Those who don’t have food, they 
have the right to food. Neighbours will provide them food for work. Those who 
are handicapped, their children will support them. If they don’t have children, 
government will take the responsibility to support them. The union chairman, 
members will support them – they are public servants too. 
 
At the Indonesian sites, participants found the concept of a right to food unfamiliar and 
difficult to grasp. This partly reflects the absence of a language of ‘right to food’ in a context 
in which stabilising the price of rice has been the priority in political discourses of food 
security.14 At the same time, although Indonesia faces severe problems of malnourishment, 
                                                             
12  A reference to Bangladesh’s war of liberation from Pakistan in 1971. The years after the war were years of great 
hunger, culminating in the 1974 famine in which 1.5 million people died. 
13  One acre = 3 bighas; 1 bigha = 1,337m2. By Bangladeshi standards, this implies a large landowner.  
14  On the politics of rice prices, see (C.P. Timmer and Dawe 2007; P. Timmer 2004). Discussions with Oxfam GB’s 
partners on their GROW campaign in Indonesia indicated that there had been little to no emphasis on ‘the right to food’ 
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hunger in the sense of calorie deficits is not widely recognised as a significant problem in 
this middle-income country. Indeed, compared to other Indonesian provinces, particularly the 
poor and drought-prone eastern province of Nusa Tenggara Timur, the three research sites 
in Western Java and in southern Kalimantan are customarily food surplus areas, and acute 
hunger is not seen as an important threat (although nutrition is another matter). In fact, the 
right to food was better understood in these settings as the ‘right to be free from starvation’, 
which echoed past episodes of famine. Researchers found that older respondents grasped 
the concept of the right to be free from starvation better than their younger counterparts, who 
had had no experience of food insecurity.15 In Indonesia, episodes of hunger are historically 
and politically associated with colonial rule; arguably, the combined effect on rice crops from 
the green revolution and transmigrant rice cultivation across the archipelago have meant that 
hunger is less prominent in public and political discourse than the nutrition crisis suggests is 
necessary. 
 
The right to eat well is also a concern. Quality was notably a higher priority for urban 
populations, for whom higher prices raise concerns about safety, diversity and taste (see N. 
Hossain, King and Kelbert 2013). The issue of quality in the right to food clearly matters: in 
Guatemala, a schoolteacher commented that the ‘secure bag’ of essential foods distributed 
by the government as part of its commitment to food security contained goods that were 
suspiciously unfamiliar and probably of poor quality. Mr AC, 25, gave a clear idea of what the 
right to food meant: ‘to have the opportunity to consume what is necessary to be healthy’. In 
his view, the official effort was unlikely to achieve that end. 
 
In Chikwanda, in the farm belt of Zambia’s Northern Province, subsistence farmers 
highlighted how understanding of their right to food was shaped by the challenges faced 
both as food producers and as consumers facing volatile prices. There, definitions of the 
right to food among focus-group participants ranged from a purely well-being focus (‘having 
enough food to eat’; ‘a life without hunger or worry about what to eat the following day’) to 
access to adequate and nutritious food and the responsibilities of public authorities to 
distribute food among those who cannot feed themselves. Even more specifically, the right 
to food meant ‘a right to affordable fertiliser’ and ‘access to land and cheap inputs [fertiliser 
and seeds] to help someone grow their own food.’ Here, it is clear that the popular discourse 
of the right to food has become attached to a live and ongoing local debate about the 
politicisation of fertiliser (see Mason, Jayne and van de Walle 2013). 
  
Not everyone thought a right to food was meaningful. Many Bolivian participants, like 45-
year-old miner JCM, were dismissive: ‘nobody is going to take away the right to eat, if so you 
are already dead’, he commented. Some people in the town of Kami in Bolivia claimed to 
have not heard of the right, while others, including members of a group of women market 
traders (including food retailers) stated there was ‘no such right in this country’, referring not 
to its existence but to its lack of realisation. One man in rural Pirhuas commented 
sardonically that it was ‘the right to feed myself’, while another said that even the beggars 
had to find their own food, by rummaging through garbage cans. Discourse on the meaning 
of the right to food thus turned into a political commentary on its (apparently unimpressive) 
implementation.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                             
to date, partly because the politics were not disposed towards such talk. See also (Hadiprayitno 2010) on the limitations 
of a human-rights basis for discussions of food security in Indonesia.  
15  Famine was common during the colonial period, particularly the 1940s; regional episodes occurred in the postcolonial 
period (notably in poor, drought-prone Lombok; see Brennan, Heathcote and Lucas 1984). But information about mass 
hunger during the Sukarno period (1950s and 1960s) may have been suppressed (van der Eng 2012). For an 
interesting account of how political charges of famine are in Indonesia, see Anderson (2014). 
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3.3 Where does the right to food come from? 
In asking people about the sources or origins of the right to food, we were hoping to access 
understandings of the legitimacy or justification for such a right, whether in law, political 
power, custom or tradition, or religion. Our questions elicited a range of responses that 
sometimes overlapped: the view of the right as 
 
 innate or natural, based on the idea that the right originates from the state of being 
human because humans must eat to survive; 
 God-given or granted by higher-order laws; 
 social, or dependent on membership of a society or community or group (such as a 
family); 
 legal, because the constitution declares the nation’s citizens have such a right; and  
 political, because political leaders are elected to take care of the country, and so they 
have a duty to protect people from hunger. 
 
Where people had a strong sense of their right to food, God or Allah was frequently invoked 
to explain the origins of that right, and as the source of human equality in respect of basic 
rights. In Karachi, 41-year-old Mrs M, mother of five and foster carer of four nephews and 
nieces, explained that: ‘Everyone has the right to food because Allah has created everyone 
equally so it does not matter if a person is rich or poor, man or woman, all have equal rights 
to eat food.’ 
 
In Burkina Faso, common notions about the right to food included agreement that although 
parents and families played the primary role, a right to food presupposed community 
solidarity, and the specific requirement to help its members in times of crisis, with the rich 
particularly enjoined to do so. As Mr K, 30, an agricultural extension worker, explained, 
‘these rights are the basis of African solidarity [although in practice hard to maintain]’. A right 
to food was also state responsibility, to (specifically) keep prices affordable. The clarity with 
which people spoke about the right to food as an innate right appeared to reflect the severity 
of the problem of hunger in that context, as well as the co-variate risk of mass hunger from 
the frequency of drought. In other words, hunger was a real and present danger, which 
Burkinabé people had recently experienced and expected to experience again.  
 
In Dhaka in Bangladesh, a group of women spoke about their right to food under the 
constitution. Interestingly, older women in the group (mostly under 30) had clearer 
understandings of their right to food than younger (and better-educated) women. Whereas 
the younger women spoke about sharing the burden of earning in a time of rising food costs 
with their husbands, the older women spoke about their rights under the law. Mrs A, 60, said:  
 
I didn’t know that the constitution says that about the right to food. But I 
understood before that we the poor will work and [that way we will] have food. 
Government can provide us a place to live, that will help us. [Then] we could 
sleep without tension. 
 
The oldest participant in the focus group, 70-year-old Mrs AJ, was also the first participant to 
mention constitutional rights. She explained to Mrs A that:  
 
We learnt from DSK [a local NGO] office that we have the right to food. They 
said that human beings have five fundamental rights, namely:  
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1. Right to vote 
2. Right to education 
3. Right to have food 
4. Right to work 
5. Right to healthcare. 
 
The ‘five rights’ were echoed by other Dhaka participants, in a clear case of the translation of 
upstream human rights to local discourse. This stronger sense of human rights (and the 
political means to claim and defend them) reflects the fact that women in their 60s and older 
experienced the 1974 famine first-hand; that event is not part of public discourse nor the 
national curriculum, so younger people will only know it from folk knowledge. However, the 
famine continues to inform public policy responses to food crises in Bangladesh, even as 
recently as 2008 (Hossain and Jahan 2014). Although the constitution mentions the right to 
food, it is not justiciable, so human rights activists consider it to be a weak right; despite this, 
a good range of policies and programmes are in place.16 
 
But while the views of many Bangladeshi participants supported the idea that a major famine 
could result in a strong anti-famine contract (regardless of the law) that would trigger public 
action to protect the right to food, the views of Ethiopian participants offered contradictory 
evidence. The Ethiopian constitution makes indirect reference to the right to food as part of a 
broader set of social rights. Perhaps reflecting this indirectness, in both the rural and urban 
sites, Ethiopian people spoke uncertainly, where at all, about the right to food; some people 
thought it was too much to describe it as ‘a right’ beyond the rights that children have to be 
fed by parents. There was a sense from both communities that an enforceable right to food 
meant moral hazard: people needed to be encouraged to work, and the expectation of free 
food might make them lazy. A recently appointed district leader said: 
 
I think hungry people have both the right and duty to get food. Hungry people 
have the right to get food through their participation in the job opportunities. The 
person can apply for a job as a right but can’t ask for food as a right. He or she 
may ask food from the community not as a right, but just as a need to survive, as 
kind of requesting help. 
In other words, people should work if they want to eat, and have ‘the right’ to earn a living. If 
that fails, they can ask for charity. But they do not have a right in any commonly agreed 
sense of the word. This meaning of ‘the right to food’ appeared to derive from official 
sources. In a focus group of farmers in their thirties it was explained that the government had  
 
already declared that people should work hard to move out of poverty and 
hunger, and people have no right to request for food while they have hands to 
work and minds to think. The government educated the people not to seek or 
beg support in time of hunger or problems. 
 
Even then, people felt that in times of disasters, when family, community and other channels 
had been exhausted, they would have to turn to the government. But it was clearly the last 
resort.  
 
The family and particularly parents were the primary source of the right to food for children in 
all the sites. This was a fairly clear understanding: helpless infants had the right to food 
because their parents had brought them into the world. Interestingly, the view that older 
people were owed care by their grown children was rarely discussed, and in Viet Nam in the 
                                                             
16  According to a draft paper on the legal basis of the right to food in Bangladesh by the Bangladesh Legal Aid Services 
Trust (BLAST) on behalf of the Right to Food Campaign in Bangladesh.  
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2012 research, we learned that the flow of inter-generational care and support was more 
often than not from elder to younger (often reluctantly so). People have rights to help by 
virtue of their membership of extended families and communities, but they were expected to 
help only if they themselves could afford to do so. That is, the rights people have through 
their social relations are powerful impulses and important social rules, but also discretionary: 
if your sisters or relatives or neighbours are themselves at risk of going hungry, your rights to 
claim help are weakened, and justifiably so. The same cannot be said of children’s rights, as 
parents will and should expect to go hungry if they need to feed their children.  
 
In Pakistan, we heard strong statements about women’s rights to food arising from their 
marital relationships. The view in these Sindh sites in Karachi and rural Dadu was that as 
providers of unpaid care, as mothers, but also on the whole, as socially sanctioned 
dependants, wives had rights to food. In Dadu, a group of teenaged boys discussed how 
everyone was entitled to food because without it they would fall sick and be unable to work, 
but for women their rights originated in their responsibilities for household work, mothering 
and feeding children as well as farming. Men’s rights to food were a higher order matter, 
because as the household head, the entire household’s well-being depends on their ability to 
earn. A group of teenaged girls explained the hierarchy of needs and responsibilities thus:  
 
Allah has created us and he is our sustainer. Everyone is entitled to have adequate food. 
Muslims and non-Muslims, all by virtue of being human beings, have the right to a proper 
diet. The children have their parents to look up to and ask for food. The wife looks up to her 
husband: ‘we are unsure [why] but the customs have always dictated it to be as it is’.  
 
Mrs M, a 56-year-old Lady Health Worker from Dadu, similarly explained that women’s rights 
were dependent on men, but men were responsible for ensuring their own right to food:  
 
Everyone is entitled to have proper food. The provider of sustenance is our 
Creator. Men, women and kids everyone has the right for food. If we do not feed 
our child he or she will cry so they have to be fed on time. The responsibility for 
catering to the child lies squarely on the parents. The responsibility for the 
woman lies on the husband or the male head of the household. However, the 
man is for himself as he is the one who is usually earning the livelihood and he 
can feed himself. 
 
Several respondents commented on what they knew of the right to food in other countries: 
one mentioned unemployment insurance; a Bangladeshi had heard that in Saudi Arabia, the 
government provides citizens with sacks of daily necessities. Dr A, a key informant from rural 
Dadu in Pakistan, knew that Norwegians received ‘allowances and stipends for basic 
sustenance’. A 22-year-old quarry worker from Pirhuas in rural Bolivia contrasted the 
situation at home with what she had seen elsewhere: ‘No, [they] do not do anything, the 
union leaders should serve the poor that suffer hunger. I lived two years in Argentina and 
have seen that there is different, there is aid for the poor...’ 
 
God featured less often in discussions of the origins or source of the right to food in Bolivia, 
but even though the state was not deemed to play an adequate role, nor did society. A 
handful of mentions about the constitution or having heard something on the radio aside, the 
idea of a right with strong foundations was absent. There was a sense of disappointed 
expectations that the incorporation of the right to food in the constitution had not yielded 
measurable change.  
 
In Guatemala, the gap between reality and what the government had promised also 
appeared to be great, but there people seemed less disillusioned and cynical about the 
foundations of the right than in Bolivia. Anyone who had an idea of the right to food, and 
others for whom such language was unfamiliar, were all clear that under their constitution, 
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Guatemalans were supposed to have basic economic rights. A number of people had heard 
about this on the television, but it had come no nearer to affecting their lives than that.17 As 
21-year-old family planning promoter, CL, said,  
 
I think that over here, each person looks for a way to survive, there is nobody 
who comes here and tells us ‘look, everybody has the right to food, come here 
everybody and have some of this’. I think that everybody struggles to survive. 
 
To Mr TA, a 48-year-old caretaker in Chichicastenango in the highlands, the basis of the 
right to food was clear enough: 
 
It is even written in our Constitution of the Republic that the government is 
responsible for satisfying all the necessities of the nation… The law is written 
there, the problem is that they hardly make it happen. Because help and aid 
programs do come here, but to reach the people who really need them does not 
happen. The constitution of the republic says that the government should watch 
over the feeding of the nation, but definitely they do not do it. 
 
A critical factor, the entire family agreed, was that help was probably reaching the people 
who were easy to reach; their relative remoteness was one reason they and others like them 
were excluded from such help, even when they actively sought assistance with livelihoods or 
jobs. Our propositions about the impact of recent debates about the right to food as a result 
of constitutional or legal reforms are partially upheld in that these Guatemalan citizens knew 
the law made provision regarding food security, even if many did not know of ‘the right to 
food’ as such. The assessment by these research participants closely matches that by the 
former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, on the 
implementation of Guatemala’s pioneering national framework law: 
 
Despite the above-mentioned plan being in place, and its excellent legal 
framework, the institutions set up to implement it appear to have been ineffective 
in practice. The limited powers of CONASAN [the governing body of the national 
food security system] are generally considered a constraint, while SESAN [the 
coordinating body] lacks political weight and has tended to focus on the 
nutritional aspects of food security rather than on issues of equity and 
sustainability. The creation of social programmes to promote food security 
outside the institutional framework has also raised issues of coordination and 
consistency (De Schutter 2010: 12).  
 
Several people in Chugüexá Primero thought that just having the knowledge of their rights 
was worthwhile, even if they were not realised, because it provided at least the basis on 
which to make demands. The fact of the knowledge of rights mattered for others, too. IK, 35, 
a greengrocer in Coast Province in Kenya, said proudly: ‘I have human rights because I am 
a human being and a citizen of Kenya. I know about them because I heard them when they 
were campaigning during the referendum.’ 
 
Elsewhere, particularly in Bolivia and among the Kenyan research participants in Nairobi, the 
sad irrelevance of such knowledge caused disillusionment and cynicism. Political and civil 
society campaigns may well have raised unrealistic hopes in settings where resources, 
administrative capacity and the political will to tackle official corruption and ensure nobody 
goes hungry were never going to be up to the task.  
 
                                                             
17 When Guatemalans talk about constitutional provisions, they may have in mind the 2005 Law on the National System 
for Food and Nutritional Security, as a result of which ‘Guatemala stands out as one of the first countries to have 
adopted a framework law on the right to food, leading a movement that now reaches almost twenty countries 
worldwide, including a number of countries in Latin America.’ (De Schutter 2010: 12).  
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3.4 Responsibilities for enacting the right to food 
Even within countries there could be differences in the extent to which local authorities were 
thought to be accountable for hunger. This indicates that national commitments and policies 
are not the only factors in shaping how people view the responsibilities for addressing the 
right to food, and that what happens at the local level influences how people view their rights 
to food, regardless of constitutional and political regimes. Another finding was that people 
did not need to have the language or concept of ‘the right to food’ in order to consider some 
institution or person responsible for tackling hunger.  
 
We saw that in Khulna, south-eastern Bangladesh, a region beset with the effects of climate 
change (cyclones, waterlogging), people seemed less confident and more critical about 
public responsibilities to deliver on the right to food than elsewhere in the country. Mr AMS, 
45, makes his living from what he can gather or glean from the forest. His understanding of 
the responsibilities for the right to food involved a series of delegations of authority: 
 
Food is needed for human subsistence. So food rights are to manage food for 
human subsistence. Allah is the only owner of managing such types of food. But 
Allah fills up these rights through someone. So the government is responsible to 
fill up this food right. But the government can’t get the rural news by itself, so the 
responsibility goes to Chairman and Member [local government representatives] 
to manage food assistance for the poor. 
 
That their remoteness was a factor diluting the political will to realise the right to food was 
echoed by Bolivian and Guatemalan participants. The closer to the centre, the more visible 
to those in power and the more accessible to those with resources, the stronger your rights 
are in reality.  
 
Even people who lack a clear sense of their right to food may have ideas about who is 
responsible for acting in crises. Mr SB, a 40-year-old weaver and father of three from Kolfe 
sub-city near Addis Ababa said: 
 
I don’t know [who is accountable for local food security]. I feel that I am the 
responsible person for the food supply of myself and my household members. 
Besides, we don’t know whom to ask and where to apply. Is it at wereda, kebele 
[administrative units] or community level? There is no information. So, I feel that 
the families are responsible for the situation. If I fall in trouble, my wife has to 
seek solutions and vice versa. But if the community is in severe hunger, the 
government has to respond. We are now asking the government officials why the 
cost of maize and other grains has increased; we raise these issues during the 
public meetings and discussions. 
The theory and the practice of the right to food frequently diverged. Mrs M, a 48-year-old 
seamstress in Chichicastenango in the Guatemalan highlands said: 
 
[The right to food comes from t]he government I would say… They make 
promises… but once they are in office they forget about them. They think only 
about themselves and do not think about the poor people any more… I think that 
the government should help the poor. There should be job opportunities so we 
are able to eat. 
 
But when asked who was responsible for realising the right to food, she said 
unequivocally:  
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The Catholic Church… They provide and visit the poor people. With the money 
that people give at church, [the priest] puts it all together and then he sends the 
people from the church to visit the poor and to bring them something, because 
there are people suffering and they do not have anything to eat. 
 
Apart from in Bolivia, where there was a strong sense that individualism had overtaken more 
solidaristic and collective norms, there was in general a clear schema about the 
responsibilities for action to make the right to food real. Individuals and families were 
primarily responsible, but communities and other local organisations bore responsibility 
when families were unable to fend for themselves or people lacked such support. In the 
Indonesian communities in central and western Java, people found the idea of a ‘right to 
food’ unfamiliar and although they thought the government was ultimately responsible, this 
was only theoretically so: in practice, these Javanese communities were very clear that most 
problems of hunger should be addressed by the local community, and that the first person to 
help someone in trouble was their neighbour. Sixty-year-old Mrs L from Bekasi in west Java 
said she had ‘never heard’ of anyone going hungry in that area, not because there was no 
risk but because the family and community system for helping people was so well-developed 
there.  
 
Some people mentioned international organisations (NGOs or the Catholic Church) as 
among those that were responsible for tackling hunger (for instance World Vision was said to 
be an important help to people in Western Oromia in Ethiopia, and ActionAid had played an 
important role in Lango Baya in Kenya). Some people in Kenya and Burkina Faso thought 
that their governments had a responsibility to act in part because they had received foreign 
aid to do so. But references to global faith or international development organisations made 
an empirical point – they had a role because they were locally present and already active, 
not because there was any a priori responsibility for addressing hunger globally. It is likely 
that if the research strategy had been to probe on this point, people may have identified 
responsibilities in the international domain, in particular the United Nations, aid agencies and 
international NGOs. But it is reasonably clear that these were not among the most important 
or immediate sources of accountability for hunger within the conceptual universe of the 
people with whom we spoke. The situation would very likely have been different in areas 
where United Nations emergency relief or refugee camps were in place. 
 
In justifying the role of the state, it could be likened to that of a parent. In contrast to the 
Ethiopian state’s position against dependency, Mr AA, the farmer from Western Oromia in 
Ethiopia, saw a natural parallel: ‘When the child becomes hungry, it cries to his/her mother. 
When the people are hungry, they report it to the government…’  
 
But despite claims of African solidarity, community strength and paternal and maternal 
responsibilities, across the groups it was clear that the state had certain mandates for 
realising the right to food. A key area of strong consensus was that the right to food of older 
people (who were unable to work) had to be protected by the state. Adult children and 
communities had some responsibilities, but it was for older people above all that the state 
was expected to act, in contrast to the right to food of children, which was universally seen 
as the responsibility of parents. Older people were said to be looked after by the Church 
(Burkina Faso), through pension schemes (Bangladesh, Bolivia, Kenya, Zambia), and by 
communities (Ethiopia). The right to food of older people clearly merits further attention.  
Rapidly changing demographic structures mean that traditional social protection systems 
(extended family structures and norms of older people living with their children) can change 
rapidly (see Bloom, Jimenez and Rosenberg 2012). As only half of all older people 
worldwide have some kind of state pension (ILO 2014), the right to food for older people 
specifically is likely to be a matter of particular urgency, the realisation of which should enjoy 
widespread support. 
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A different angle on the right to food entailing the responsibility to work was the implied 
responsibility of governments to ensure agricultural production was possible. This involved 
the right to grow food and therefore the necessary supports to do so, usually inputs and 
land. For farmers as far apart as the western highlands of Guatemala and the Northern 
Province of Zambia, the politicised distribution of fertiliser was mentioned in relation to 
discussions about the right to food. A community leader in Lango Baya, in the dry Coast 
Province of Kenya said: 
  
Government therefore has the responsibility to make food available and 
affordable, even if it means buying food from other countries. In addition, the 
government should make sure that the services offered by the Ministry of 
Agriculture reach all people on the ground. They should be very strict on the field 
extension officers who ought to support farmers through farming education and 
supervision. 
 
In Lango Baya, the ongoing drought meant that local chiefs saw the prime 
responsibility to address the right to food as the provision of irrigation. The NGO 
ActionAid had been helpful to farmers in that area, but had left two years ago, 
underlining the fact that non-government action can be useful but it cannot be 
demanded as a right.  
 
An emphasis on programmes of direct food or cash assistance was inevitable, partly 
because we tried to relate the concept of the right to food to experiences of trying to access 
help in times of hunger or distress. A common theme about governmental responsibilities 
was the need to stabilise prices and ensure affordable access to food, by stopping exports, 
keeping sufficient stocks, selling goods in fair price outlets, and providing food assistance. 
Here the right to food expressly treads on the toes of the market, demanding regulation and 
intervention. These ideas indicate show that despite the apparently neoliberal-friendly ideas 
of moral hazard and dependency, and an emphasis on the right to food as the right to work, 
there remains a strong reserve of expectation of state action in times of food crisis – but 
primarily if food crisis happens at scale, i.e. when entire communities suffer. As noted above, 
in cases such as Ethiopia, an emphasis on refusing dependence may speak of ideological 
resistance to authoritarian collectivisation strategies in food production; to the extent that 
they speak of local control and resistance to state intervention, ideas about the right to food 
are more closely attuned to a food sovereignty agenda than a resistance to the guarantee of 
rights. That is, the moral economy is alive and well in these views (see also Vanhaute 2011).  
 
4 Conclusions and implications  
This paper explores what it calls ‘common sense’ thinking about the right to food – ideas that 
are broadly shared across groups and populations, and which resonate with how the right to 
food is made sense of in everyday life. By collecting and exploring these ideas we hope to 
provide food for thought (forgive us) for human rights defenders, politicians, international aid 
bureaucrats and activists involved in food security, food sovereignty and food rights.  
The results of this research, an unusually wide exploration of vernacular rights talk in relation 
to food,18 offer insights into shared understandings of the right to food, as well as of the lines 
along which and reasons why understandings may differ. We expect that this exercise may 
help provide insights into how the right to food may be translated or indigenised across 
                                                             
18  We are aware that we have more than likely missed unpublished efforts by grassroots organisations to bring local 
conceptions of the right to food, and are keen to hear from researchers/ activists who have more to say on what the 
right to food means in different contexts.  
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different social political and cultural contexts and food policy regimes, and the extent and 
form of popular aspirations for protection against hunger. We also hope that the findings may 
be used to support efforts to mobilise around the right to food, and to advocate for its 
realisation.  
From the variety of knowledge and views in these 20 locations across Africa, Asia and Latin 
America, it is clear that the process of ‘vernacularising’ the right to food is far from complete, 
although there are instances where human and vernacular rights enjoy a productive tension 
(or friction, in Tsing’s 2005 term). This makes sense given that the right has relatively 
recently become the object of social movements and political campaigns. Where civil society 
or social movements have raised awareness about constitutional or political rights, 
translation has occurred, but transplanted ideas have not always taken root within local 
political discourse, or are resisted as meaningless, perhaps as official propaganda. This is 
not the same as Englund’s finding that human rights discourses are translated in ways that 
satisfy powerful groups in Malawi, but one instead about the use of rights talk in wider 
political agendas which fail because governments ‘talk the talk’ but fail to ‘walk the walk’.  
These universal, or common, senses of the right to food have not travelled easily: in some 
places these ideas have no local resonance at all. But where they have travelled they have, 
as Tsing says of ‘engaged universals’, been ‘charged and changed by their travels’, 
rendered real – or rejected as concretely false – through their encounter with the 
practicalities of institutions of accountability for hunger (2005: 8). Even in countries that have 
taken steps to enshrine international law in national constitutions or laws, an understanding 
of the right to food as a claimable right enforceable by international law is (understandably) 
absent. On the other hand, these findings suggest a widespread – quite probably ‘universal’ 
at a basic level – understanding of rights to food as innate or natural, because the right to 
food means the right to be or to live at all. A pedantic response would be to argue that the 
right to food is no more innate in this respect than the right to water or air or the other 
elements of life; but in none of these communities have people had the experience of being 
denied air or water. By contrast, all know of situations in which people have been deprived of 
food and been unable to survive. To that extent, the right to food carries with it the political 
weight of lived experience that some other economic and social rights lack. 
It is encouraging that in countries in which, within living memory, people had died from 
hunger and associated illnesses (e.g. Burkina Faso and Bangladesh), the idea of a right to 
food meant more than the right to basic survival. It meant the right to eat sufficiently well for 
good health and a good life – the right to thrive, in other words. That is, the right to food in 
popular conception is not the minimal vision of protection against the Hobbesian state of 
nature, but a richer, fuller vision of human flourishing and well-being. 
It is also clear that political discourses of different roles in the management of nutrition and 
hunger influence how people understand rights and responsibilities for food. At times the 
official political discourse is at odds with people’s own more mundane ideas of natural rights 
to food (as appeared to be the case in Ethiopia). In other cases, the popular discourse 
rejected the official position, affirming a right to food as token or false or politically motivated 
but essentially unrealised (as in Kenya and Bolivia). But the variations across contexts 
suggest that it is possible to influence how people view the accountability for hunger through 
shaping the clarity with which they understand their rights to food, and the responsibilities for 
realising them. In other words, we think there remains a great deal of scope for political 
dialogue about rights and responsibilities in relation to food. 
A note of caution is also sounded in the findings. We see, particularly in urban Kenya and in 
Bolivia, that ‘disengaged universals’ – talk of rights without the hope of effective action – can 
be frustrating and disillusioning. While the universal human right to food may remain a 
political aspiration, it is not always clear how best to mobilise popular support around a right 
on which governments are unwilling or unable to deliver. One possibility suggested by our 
research findings is to mobilise around the right as a frame for efforts to strengthen 
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accountability for hunger at local levels (or social accountability). However, the resources 
available to frontline officials to respond may be inadequate because of failures of 
accountability among policymakers at the apex of the triangle (see Figure 1). In such 
contexts, Merry’s translators and intermediaries are tasked with an important but sensitive 
job of aggregating local concerns and framing them within the local politics of hunger.  
On the other hand, in countries like Guatemala, which according to the Hunger and Nutrition 
Commitment Index 2013 (te Lintelo et al. 2014) displays the highest levels of political 
commitment to reduce hunger among 45 high-burden countries, budgets, policies and 
institutional mechanisms are in place to realise the right to food. In such contexts, there is 
clear potential for political mobilisation and for better holding governments to account. In 
such contexts, a pragmatic approach to translating human rights into local action may be to 
focus on those groups for whom the immediate action towards the progressive realisation of 
rights is both urgent and feasibly contained. It is clear, for instance, that while many people 
see the rights to infants and children as inscribed within parental roles, they do not similarly 
see older people as having strong rights through relationships to adult children. Across these 
communities we heard that older people fall out of the food safety net. This matter clearly 
merits further investigation but it is likely that economic and social development, and the 
demographic transition that comes with that, will mean less extended family support and so 
weaker food security for older people. This makes the right to food for older people an area 
of obvious and particular importance. While there is a great focus on early childhood nutrition 
for instrumental reasons that include its contribution to later development, similarly positive-
sum arguments about the rights to food or nutrition security of older people are harder to 
make. These arguments need to be presented on rights-based grounds, because the well-
being of older people appears to be under threat from a weakening of social rights to food 
within families and communities across these developing countries.19 And the clear and 
shared nature of the recognition that the right to food applies in particular to older people 
who may not be able to work or feed themselves makes this a clear starting point for global 
campaigns on the right to food.  
While advocacy campaigns may influence understandings that strengthen accountability for 
hunger, ideas about the right to food are themselves vernacularised by intertwining with the 
deep roots of the politics of subsistence and the moral economy. The collective memory of 
the experience of episodes of mass acute food insecurity, the institutional responses that 
evolve to prevent or mitigate hunger over time, and the culture of political accountability can 
give rise to collective action on hunger. NGO advocacy campaigns to raise awareness of 
human rights are likely to benefit from working with the grain of those memories and 
institutions and cultures. There are instances in which efforts to raise awareness about the 
right to food have been detached from those deeper histories of the politics of subsistence, 
and from the moral economy language with which they are articulated. Activists, NGOs and 
human rights advocates can do more to turn food crises into opportunities to strengthen the 
right to food. They should ensure that societies do not forget episodes of mass hunger, and 
document such events in order to strengthen the case for public action when such events 
threaten. From the contrasts between how people view their right to food in Burkina Faso 
and Bangladesh on the one hand and Ethiopia and Kenya on the other, it seems that major 
food crises do not in themselves engender a strong sense of the right to food, or a popular 
political culture of accountability for hunger. What matters is how the state responds, 
whether it plays a credible role in addressing food shocks, and whether it can be relied on to 
do so again in the future. 
                                                             
19  Champions of food security interventions for older people try to make instrumental arguments: HelpAge International 
argues that most people over 60 remain economically active, so supporting their food security makes economic good 
sense – as well as a matter of human rights (Collodel and HelpAge International 2012). And it is not only in developing 
countries that the food and nutrition security of older people is a concern; see, for example, a recent study of food 
insecurity among older Americans (Ziliak and Gundersen 2011). 
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